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A Fractured Establishment's

Responses

to Social Movement Agitation: The U.S. Supreme Court and
the Negotiation of an Outsider Point of Entry
in Walker v. City of Birmingham
Carlo A. Pedrioli
Barry University School of Law
In classical social movement theory scholars have identified the advocates of change as elements of
agitation and the establishment as the entity that responds in an attempt to control the agiøtors @owers,
Ochs, & Jensen 8 & 48-49). Decision-makers with power presumed to be legitimate comprise the
establishment @owers, Ochs, & Jensen 4). This classical approach has assumed that the establishment is
a generally monolithic entity that responds in a unified manner to the efforts of the advocates of change.
V/hile this approach may accurately characterize some rhetorical situations, it does not necessarily
have to characterize all such situations. For example, one would probably describe thejudiciary as a
part of the establishment because judges are well-connected and powerful individuals who, in many
cases, have benefited from existing power structures. Although the judiciary, through majority
opinions, makes decisions on appeals that come before it, the judiciary also issues dissenting opinions
that can directly contradict the majority opinions. Hence, if the judiciary is sending mixed signals, it
cannot always function as a virtually monolithic entity within the establishment.
As the head of the federal judiciary, one of the three branches of the U.S. government, the U.S.
Supreme Court certainly represents the establishment. The Supreme Court has 'othe awesome
authority to nullify any governmental act" in conflict with the Constitution, and the Constitution is
essentially what the Court says it is (Schwartz379).In the early nineteenth century, Chief Justice John
Marshall asserted, "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is" (Marbury v. Madison 177). Consequently, the Supreme Court is a key decision-maker within
the governmental power structure.
The Supreme Court primarily is made up of elite members of society with "wealth, power, and
status" (Bowers, Ochs, & Jensen 8), and this was true during the first half of 1967. For instance, Earl
ÌVarren had studied at the University of California, Berkeley, and had been both attorney general and
governor in California (Epstein & Walker 860). Hugo Black had been a U.S. senator, and William
Douglas had studied at Columbia University and been a law professor (Epstein & Walker 856 & 857).
Meanwhile, Tom Clark had been a student at the University of Texas and later had become attorney
general for the United States, and John Marshall Harlan had received his education at Princeton
University and Oxford University, eventually acting as chief counsel for the New York State Crime
Commission (Epstein & Walker 857 & 858). William Brennan had studied at the University of
Pennsylvania and Harvard University, later sitting on the New Jersey Supreme Court, while Potter
Stewart had studied at Yale University and Cambridge University, later becoming a federal court of
appeals judge (Epstein & \ilalker 856 & 860). Also, Byron White had obtained his education at Oxford
University and Yale University and held a position as a deputy U.S. attorney general (Epstein &
Walker 861). Finally, Abe Fortas had studied at Yale University and been counsel for various federal
agencies (Epstein & Walker 857). In the typical manner of members of the Court, these elite members
of society were in positions that enabled them to act as establishment decision-makers.
107
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The idea that the judiciary does not always function as a generally homogeneous entity within the
establishment calls for further study, particularly in a case in which a prominent judicial body issued
very mixed signals to the advocates of change and to society more generally. The 1967 civil rights
protest case of Walker v. City of Birminghar¿, which the above Court heard, is one such case. In
Walker, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld by a vote of five to four the collateral bar rule, which says
that parties to a legal dispute may not challenge the validity of a court's injunction by violating the

injunction (Subrin, Minow, Brodin, & Main 175;Walkcr 314). An injunction is a court's order to
parties of a lawsuit to take or refrain from taking a specifi'c action ("Injunction" 788). Two years later,
in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, the Court found that the Birmingham protest ordinance in
Walker violated the First Amendmentt (Shuttlesworth 158-59). Nonetheless, the immediate effect of
the Court's decision in Walker was to restrict the ability of members of the civil rights movement,

including Martin Luther King, Jr., to march tegally on short-term notice in protest of racially
discriminatory laws.
Walkeris an important case for analysis in part because the case became an ongoing and prominent
news story beginning with its origins in 1963. On April 12,l963,the New YorkTimes reported in pageone fashion that the previous day Martin Luther King and other civil rights leaders had violated an
Alabama state court injunction that barred them from marching in protest of discriminatory laws
(Hailey, "Negroes Defying" 1). On April 13 of the same year, the Times provided page-one coverage
of the arrests of King, Ralph Abernathy, and other civil rights protesters, which had taken place the
day before (Hailey, "Dr. King Arrested" l). In the April 13 report, the newspaper provided
photographic coverage of the arrests of King and Abernathy, showing the two men in the process of
being taken to a police van (Hailey, "Dr. King Arrested" 1). The Times also reported on King's ensuing
contempt hearing and conviction ("Dr. King's Hearing" 20,"Dr. King Convicted" 9). Approximately
four years later, when the U.S. Supreme Court eventually announced its decision in Walker, the Times
covered the Court's upholding the convictions of King and other Black civil rights leaders for
violating the Alabama trial court's temporary injunction ("Dr. King Loses Plea" l).
Of historical note, during his imprisonment that resulted from the events that eventually led to the
Supreme Court's decision in the case, King wrote what became his famous "Letter from Birmingham
Jail" (MichelmanT6), in which King responded to eight White religious leaders of Birmingham who
had criticized his civil disobedience approach to fighting social injustice ("Dr King Loses Plet' 26,
Fulkerson 122). Because it made the case for civil disobedience, King's "earnest plea addressed to
fellow clergymen" soon "became one of the classic statements of the civil rights movement" (Gaipa
280, "Dr King Loses Pled'26). Commentators have regarded the "LetteC'as "Kingns greatest written
work' (Oppenheimer 662).
Beyond the attention the news media gave to the protests and the historical significance that
stemmed from King's "Letter," the Walker case has the potential for reconfiguring social movement
theory. For instance, Walker provides a clear example of agitation by members of a historically
recognized social movement; in the sequence of events that set up the case, Black civil rights
protesters, including King, marched in violation of a court injunction, as noted above. Besides having
clear agitation, the case provides competing responses from the establishment to the violation of the
injunction. Going beyond the simplistic binary of agitation and control, the case adds clashing
versions of control that vie to justify their positions. Thus, Walker presents a classical agitation and
control social movement situation but throws in the rhetorical twist of fractured control.
An underlying assumption of this paper is that free speech and social movements are closely
related (Fraleigh 190). Indeed, free speech doctrine and social movements mutually shape each other
(Koehler 73). Just as Walker limited speech rights and thus restricted the rights of members of the civil
rights movement, the rhetoric of the civil rights movement helped to open the door to the famous case
of New York Times Company v. Sullivan, which revolutionized libel law (Hopkins 2-3).
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In light of the potential for expanding social movement theory beyond an essentially monolithic
understanding of the establishment, Walker affords communication scholars an opportunity for
needed development of social movement theory. Therefore, this paper will argue that two key texts
fromWalker, the majority opinion of Justice Potter Stewart and a dissent by Justice William Brennan,
demonstrate how the establishment can fracture in its response to the speech of advocates of change.
To make this argument, the paper initially will address some foundations of social movement theory
in communication studies. Then the paper will review the background of the Wølker case in greater
detail. After reviewing the case, the paper will provide analysis of the two judicial opinions noted
above. Finally, the paper will offer some implications of the analysis.
Theoretical Foundations of Social Movements
Since the 1950s, but more so since the 1960s and 1970s, communication scholarship has offered
a theoretical understanding of social movements (Henry 97). Classical social movement scholarship
in communication has held that social movements take place under specific circumstances and in a
sequence. Normally, for a social movement to develop, people have to be dissatisfied with some
aspect of their environment and want change (Griffin, "The Rhetoric" 184). Individuals with sha¡ed
beliefs engage in shared activities (Hahn & Gonchar 44-46), trying to bring about change (Griffin,
"The Rhetoric" 184). After time has passed, the attempts at change either have made some progress
or not, and the social movement has come to an end (Grifñn, "The Rhetoric" 184).
This classical scholarship has suggested a number of characteristics of social movements. For

social movement has some degree of organization, and the movement is noninstitutionalized, which means that it is outside of the establishment (Stewart, Smith, & Denton 2 &
5). Also, a social movement is large in scope with regard to "geographical area, time, events,
instance,

a

organizations, participants, goals, strategies, and critical adaptations" (Stewart, Smith, & Denton 8).
Within a social movement, leadership plays an important role (Simons, "Requirements" 3-4).
Leadership puts a face or faces on the movement that the public will come to recognize as symbolic
of the movement (Stewart, Smith, & Denton lll-12). In addition to attracting, maintaining, and
molding followers (Simons, "Requirements" 3), leaders also help to organize a movement and make
decisions within the movement (Stewart, Smith, & Denton 107-10).
Such a movement must engage in agitation, which is "persistent, long{erm advocacy of social change,
where resistance to fhe change is also persistent and long-term" (Bowers, Ochs, & Jensen 3). More
specifically, agitation involves'þople outside the normal decision-making establishment" who strive for
"significant social change" and "encounter. . . resistance within the establishment such as to require more
than the normal discursive means of persuasion" @owers, Ochs, & Jensen 4). The agitation, which calls
for a change in the status quo, is by nature political (Stewart, Smith, & Denton 225-n).
To this agitation, the establishment then responds, often with an attempt at control (Bowers, Ochs,
& Jensen 8). Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen have listed several responsive strategies, including avoidance,
suppression, adjustment, and capitulation (48-49). Stewart, Smith, and Denton have listed the
responsive strategies as evasion, counterpersuasion, coercive persuasion, coercion, adjustment, and
capitulation (325).
A major focus of classical social movement studies has been verbal communication, either oral or
written. This focus should not be surprising because the study of social movements fits within the field
of public address (Grifñn, "The Rhetoric" 188), which traditionally focused on verbal messages. In
suggesting texts for analysis, Grifftn offered texts of the following types of rhetors, rlmong others:
lecturers; pulpit, political, legislative, academic, and forensic orators; editors; journalists; novelists;
dramatists; and poets ("The Rhetoric" 187). Historical texts for study could include "books,
pamphlets, broadsides, tracts, almanacs, newspapers, and periodicals, the pulpit, the lecture platform,
the political rostrum, the stump, and the stage" (Griff,rn, "The Rhetoric" 187).
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This classical conception of social movements has received criticism over the years. Some
communication scholars have challenged various general aspects of the classical understanding of
social movements. For instance, McGee argued that critics should see social movements as meanings
rather than as phenomena(233-M), McGee's position calls for shifting scholarly attention away from
the study of human organizational behavior and toward the study of human consciousness (242). Also,
Zarcfsky suggested that social movement rhetoric is not necessarily different from other types of
rhetoric, and hence he has proffered that social movement theory does not add much to an
understanding of rhetoric (245-54).
In addition, scholars have offered critiques of specific aspects of the classical understanding of
social movements. Responding to the usual focus on the verbal content of social movements, Haiman
suggested that social movement rhetoric, if it includes "all the available means of persuasion," would
be more than simply the verbal ("The Rhetoric" 99-100), and Griffin considered body rhetoric, such
as the use of the African-American body in 1960s civil rights protests, as a type of nonverbal rhetoric
employed in social movements ("The Rhetorical Structure" 127).In other words, "putting one's body
where one's mouth is . . . is a rhetorical act" (Haiman, "Nonverbal Communication" 381). Deluca has
explained how social movement spectacles called image events, which are made for television and
other visual media, can be points of entry into the establishment for outsiders (l-22).

Taking issue with social movement scholars who have focused on either verbal or nonverbal
elements of social movement rhetoric, Enck-Wanzer has theorized about intersectional rhetoric,
which is rhetoric within which no one type of discourse is privileged over others (191). Enck-Wanzer
describes intersectional rhetoric as including words, images, and bodies (191), but, in more traditional
terms, such rhetoric would consist of verbal and nonverbal elements. In "refus[ing] to recognize the
singularity or boundedness of any solitary rhetorical form," such rhetoric works to resist hegemonic
norms for social movement rhetoric (Enck-Wanzer 193).
Further criticism has problematized the leader-focused nature of much social movement
scholarship. Enck-lVanzer has noted how leader-focused studies can be limiting because such studies
do not encourage effective study of groups that consider themselves as collectives (180). Often, such
groups have resisted the emergence of leaders and thus do not fit the classical social movement model
(Enck-Wanzer 180).
Finally, Wilson has expanded upon the notion of prudence in a way that is useful to the study of
social movements. As Wilson sees it, prudence is "a coveted space of legitimacy that [rhetors] attempt
to occupy by discursively controlling its meaning" or "a contested space that political actors struggle
to control through discourse" (133). A different way of approaching prudence would be to say that
rhetors possess prudence "when they calculate well with a view to attaining some particular end or

value" (Levasseur 333-34). Since prudential performances are easier to carry out than locate,
identifying them is not always a simple task (Jasinski 456).
The Background of Walker v.

City of Birmingham

To provide a better understandin g of Walker, this section of the paper addresses the background of
the case. In the interest of offering a reasonably balanced overview of the events that led to the case,
the paper blends background material from both Stewart's majority opinion and Brennan's dissent.
Late on the night of ÏVednesday, April 10, 1963, city officials of Birmingham, Alabama, asked an
Alabama court to grant a temporary injunction that would prohibit various civil rights protesters,
including Wqlker petitioners Martin Luther King, Ralph Abernathy, Fred Shuttlesworth, and ûve other
Black ministers, from "participating in or encouraging mass street parades or mass processions without
a permit as required by a Birmingham ordinance" (Walker 340, 309,341, &.338). Birmingham City

Code Section 1159 provided that, upon request, the city would grant a permit unless "'the public
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welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good ordeç morals or convenience"' required that the city not
issue the permit (Watker 309). In asking for the injunction, the city maintained that the civil rights
protesters had engaged in previous conduct that breached the peace, threatened public safety, and put
a strain upon the police department(Walker309). That night, the court granted the temporary injunction
without notice to the civil rights protesters (Walkcr 309 & 340).
The next day, Thursday, April I l, after several ofthe petitioners received notice ofthe injunction,

they declared at a press conference their intention to defy the injunction and then distributed a
message (Watker 310 & 341). The message observed that Alabama had "openly defied the
desegregation decision of the [U.S.] Supreme Court" and permitted "raw tyranny under the guise of
maintaining law and order" (Walker323). As a way of "opurify[ing] the judicial system,"' on April 12,
which was Good Friday, King, Abernathy, and Shuttlesworth led fifty or sixty individuals in a march
from a black church and toward city hall as a crowd of one thousand to fifteen hundred people
observed (Watker324,3l0, &.341). Several members of the crowd followed the parade (Walker3ll).
Two days later, April 14, which was Easter Sunday, a group of about fifty people left a black church
and marched down the street, while a crowd of fifteen hundred to two thousand people watched
(Watker 3lI & 341). About three or four hundred individuals followed the parade (Walker 3ll).
A contempt of court proceeding ensued. At the hearing, the petitioners attempted to attack the
constitutionality of both the temporary injunction and Birmingham City Code Section 1159, claiming
they were vague, overbroad, and unlawful restrictions on free speech (Walker 3ll). The petitioners
also claimed that the city officials had administered the ordinance in an "arbitrary and discretionary
manner" (Walker 311). Moreover, the petitioners attempted to put on testimony to show that they had
tried to obtain permits (Watker 339). For instance, a member of the Alabama Christian Movement for
Human Rights testified that the member had gone to city hatl to inquire about permits (Walker 339).
At city hall, Police Commissioner Connor had replied, "No, you will not get a permit in Birmingham,
Alabamal,] to picket. I will picket you over to the City Jail" (Walker 339). Connor repeated that
statement twice (Walker 339). Two days later, Shuttlesworth sent Connor a telegram to request a
permit, but Connor answered, "I insist that you and your people do not start any picketing on the
streets in Birmingham, Alabama" (Walkcr 339-40).
The trial court, asserting that it could look only at its jurisdiction over the injunction and whether the
petitioners knowingly had violated the injunction, imposed upon each petitioner a jail sentence of five
days and a fine of fifty dollars (Walker 3I2). In upholding the lower court's decision against the
petitioners, the Alabama Supreme Court remarked, "Petitioners did not file any motion to vacate the
temporary injunction until after the Friday and Sunday parades. Instead, petitioners deliberately defied
the order of the court . . l' (Walker 312-13). The petitioners requested that the U.S. Supreme Court grant
certiorari, which is done at the Court's discretion (Nowak & Rotunda 28-29), and the Court did so.
Analysis of the Opinions
With this overview of the background of Walker presented, the paper now considers the more partisan
factual narratives, as well as the legal arguments, that Stewart's majority opinion and Brennan's dissent
offer. Joining Stewart in the majority were Hugo Black, Tom Clark, John Marshall Harlan, and Byron
White. Joining Brennan's dissent were Earl'Warren, William Douglas, andAbe Fortas.
Although Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas also wrote dissents, this paper will focus on
the dissent of Justice Brennan. Among the three justices who wrote dissents, Brennan and Douglas
were well-known for their pro-free speech opinions (Wicker 46, Bollinger 88), and, in Walker,
Brennan's dissent was more extensive than Douglas'dissent. Also, since the three justices who wrote
dissents offered similar arguments, including that established constitutional rights should take priority
over an unconstitutional statute packaged in a court injunction (Walker 334,338, e.346), Brennan's
dissent ought to provide an adequate sampling of the criticisms of the majority opinion.
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Of importance is the point that, regardless of how persuasive one may find Brennan's dissent, or
the dissent of Warren or Douglas, the majority opinion, as always, prevailed. Unlike a dissent,
Stewart's opinion has weight as binding precedent in similar cases. While Brennan's dissent explains
why Stewart and the majority erred, as well as why, if a similar case should appear in the future, the
Court should change its position, such a dissent carries no precedential value.

Factual Narratives in the Opinions
In presenting his narrative of the events of the case, Justice Stewart focuses on the legal violations
of the protesters. Stewart notes that the Alabama trial court granted the temporary injunction that
prohibited the protesters from marching and then carefully adds that the court had a legitimate reason
for doing so, specifically that the civil rights protesters previously had engaged in conduct that
breached the peace, threatened public safety, and put a strain upon the police department (Walker
309). Hence, the lower court acted properly.
According to Stewart's narrative, the protesters received notice of the injunction and then promptly
declared their intention to defy the injunction (Walker 310 & 311). They acted on this desire to defy
the court's order, marching on both Good Friday and Easter Sunday (Walker 310 & 311). As such,
Stewart tells a story of individuals who, despite having notice of the injunction, knowingly violated a
justified court order against marching.
Writing in dissent, Brennan tells a much different story of the events that set up the Walker case,
instead pointing out the injustices that the protesters faced along the way to the violation of the
injunction. He notes that, late on the night of April 10, city officials of Birmingham asked anAlabama
court for a temporary injunction that would prohibit civil rights protesters from "engaging in,
sponsoring, inciting or encouraging mass street parades or mass processions or like demonstrations
without a permit . . !' (Walker 340). That night, since the civil rights protesters were not invited to the
hearing, the court granted the temporary injunction without any notice to the protesters (Walker 34O).
This description is one of a covert misuse of legal power, certainly not one of open justice where both
parties could make their arguments in court.
Furthermore, Brennan's narrative goes to great lengths to point out how the protesters had made
efforts to behave lawfully until they had no other options besides violating the law or missing the chance
to send their message during Easter weekend. Given attempts by the civil rights protesters to obtain a
permit lawfully and the response by the White establishment, the protesters, to send the message they
sought to send on Easter weekend, felt that they had no other choice but to violate the law.

Legal Arguments in the Opinions
These two narratives of the events that led up to the Walker case help the justices make divergent
legal arguments about how to resolve the matter at hand. Stewart frames the legal issue as whether the
rule that parties to a legal action who receive notice of an injunction from a court of general
jurisdiction must obey the injunction, no matter how erroneous the action of the court may be, is
constitutionally appropriate (Walker 314-15). Here, Stewart focuses on the duty to obey that the
protesters had, not whether the law is just.

Consistent with his proffered narrative, Stewart addresses the legal violations of the protesters. In
laying out what he sees as the appropriate legal rule to decide this case, the justice quotes favorably
the 1922 U.S. Supreme Court case Howat v. Kansøs, which itself cites prior authority:
An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with equity powers
upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served upon persons made parties
therein and within the jurisdiction, must be obeyed by them however erroneous the
action of the court may be, even if the error be in the assumption of the validity of a
seeming but void law going to the merits of the case (Wølkcr 314).
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Stewart observes that federal courts have followed this rule of law, called the collateral bar rule
(Subrin, Minow, Brodin, & Main 175), and that the rule, as Stewart understands it, is thus appropriate
(Wqlker 314). The rule applies unless an injunction is "transparently invalid" or has "only a frivolous
pretense to validity" (Walker 315).
Applying the rule to his understanding of the facts, Stewart determines that the lower state court
had jurisdiction over the petitioners and the subject matter in controversy (Walker 315). Moreover, the
injunction was not "transparently invalid," and it had more than "a frivolous pretense to validity"
(Walker 315). For added effect, the justice downplays the petitioners' reliance on free speech issues,
rejecting the notion that the First Amendment gives marching and picketing the same protection as
pure speech, and he adds that states have a strong interest in regulating the use oftheir streets(Walker
316 & 315). According to Stewart, no matter the excuse that the protesters may offer, violation of the
law remains unacceptable.
Stewart does make several concessions to the petitioners, but the concessions do not change his
decision. For example, he acknowledges that the Birmingham ordinance would "unquestionably be
subject to a substantial constitutional question," perhaps for overbreadth and vagueness (Walker3lT).
Nonetheless, the petitioners should not have assumed that the ordinance was facially invalid and
instead ought to have applied to the lower court to request modification or dissolution of the injunction
(Walker 316-17). Also, Stewart admits that the petitioners might have succeeded in claiming that the
city previously had administered the ordinance "in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion," but the
petitioners did not make an application to the lower court regarding this matter (Walker 317-19). Ín
essence, legal precedent gave the petitioners notice that they could not bypass judicial review of the
injunction before they disobeyed the injunction (Walker 320).
Concluding, Stewart again focuses on the protesters' violations of the law, noting "that in the fair
administration of justice no man can be judge in his own case, however exalted his station, however
righteous his motives" (Walker 320-21). Regardless of the petitioners' cause, "respect for judicial
process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning
to constitutional freedom" (Walker 321).
As one would expect from Brennan's factual narrative, Brennan makes a strikingly different legal
argument from that of Stewart. Brennan begins by framing the issue as whether a court may hold the

petitioners criminally liable for violation of a facially unconstitutional injunction and a facially
unconstitutional ordinance, where the city has applied the parade ordinance in a discriminatory
manner (Wqlker 342). Rather than looking at a duty to obey the law, as does Stewart, Brennan looks
at the injustice in the case under review.
In his dissent, Brennan strongly objects to the Court's holding, viewing it as a "distortion in the
hierarchy of values" of U.S. society (Walker338). He notes that, although states are free to promulgate
rules designed to promote respect for court orders, this observation does not allow states to harm

"more vital interests" (Walker 343-44). In short, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
demands "that a valid state interest must give way when it infringes on rights guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution" (Wqlker 344). In the case at hand, Alabama's interest is the promotion of
adherence to court orders, and the petitioners' interests are the First Amendment rights of speech,
peaceable assembly, and petitioning the government for redress of grievance s (Walker 344). Citing the
1931 case of Near v. Minnesota and the 1967 case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, among other
cases, Brennan notes that the Court previously had acknowledged the "chilling effect" that prior
restraint, vagueness, and overbreadth can have upon First Amendment rights "so high in the scale of
constitutional values" (Walker 344-45 &. 347).
Furthermore, Brennan points out how Birmingham had avoided, but should not have been allowed
to avoid, the spirit ofthe law. Specifically, precedent supports the notion that a party's failure to obtain
a license under a facially invalid ordinance does not prevent an appellate court from later reviewing
the party's conviction under the ordinance (Walker 345-46). However, Brennan describes as an
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"inscrutable legerdemain" Birmingham's avoiding this rule of law by taking "the precaution to have
some judge append his signature to an ex parte order which recites the words of the invalid statute"
(Walker 346). Because of such judicial action, the petitioners, who have marched already, can no
longer challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, nor can they challenge the constitutionality of
the injunction (Walker 347).
Beyond considering the spirit of the law, Brennan notes the inappropriateness of silencing the
petitioners pending outcome of the legal process (Walker 348). A halt in the petitioners' actions might
damage the petitioners'efforts to march against segregation (Walker348-49). Also, petitioners, all
religious leaders, desired to use Good Friday and Easter Sunday to gain special attention for their
cause, and the timing of their march was critical to their message (Walker 349). The Court essentially
ignores the impediments to the petitioners' striving toward their goals.
In concluding, Brennan sees the Court's holding as an unconstitutional prior restraint and thus "a
devastatingly destructive weapon for infringement of freedoms jealously safeguarded" (Walker 349).
Convictions for contempt of constitutionally impermissible court orders must receive the same
judicial condemnation as convictions for constitutionally impermissible statutes (Walker 349). Hence,
unlike Stewart, who focuses on violation of the law, Brennan looks at the problem with the law itself
and excuses the protesters' violation of the law because of their attempts to work toward racial justice.
Discussion of the Opinions

This consideration of the two opinions points out how the establishment majority and the
establishment dissent respond very differently to the agitation of the civil rights protesters. The
establishment majority, as articulated by Stewart, uses counterpersuasion, or discourse "that
challenge[s] a social movement's version of reality" (Stewart, Smith, & Denton 327), to explain that
the protesters had failed to obey the law. Such a strategy characterizes the protesters "as ill-advised
and lacking merit" (Stewart, Smith, & Denton 327). Since this strategy of counterpersuasion has the
backing of the government's enforcement power, the control strategy has a coercive edge to it, too.
In contrast, because the establishment dissent declines to "challenge [the protesters'] version of
reality" (Stewart, Smith, & Denton 327), and instead accepts such a version of reality, the dissent
relies upon persuasion rather than counterpersuasion. Brennan's opinion focuses on the unjust nature
of the case at hand, in which individuals'speech rights are constrained. Thus, the protesters, who want
to employ body rhetoric, as Griffin described it ("The Rhetorical Structure" 127), and march in an
attempt to bring attention to their quest to improve society, should have the right to do so in a way that
allows them to communicate their desired message, regardless of whether this process involves
violation of an unjust law or injunction. However, since the opinion does not have the weight of a
majority opinion and consequently the backing of the government's enforcement power, the opinion
lacks a coercive edge.
Nonetheless, the interaction of Brennan's dissent with Stewart's majority opinion is critical.
Brennan's opinion offers a forum in which part of the establishment speaks on behalf of the agitators
as the majority and the dissent, both very much parts of the establishment, engage each other in
negotiation of potential change. In law, this rhetoric between competing and powerful insider factions
is how the establishment can begin to consider change. Moreover, since this negotiation is discursive
as opposed to violent, the direct threat to society is less than the threat that might result from outright
violence on the street as an alternate means of change. Hence, in law, a dissenting opinion as engaged
with the majority opinion can be a site for negotiation of outsider-proposed change that is both
important and nonviolent.
Such negotiation of change can be thought of in terms of what is prudent in the case at hand. As
noted above, prudence is "a coveted space of legitimacy that [rhetors] attempt to occupy by

A Fractured Establishrnent's Responses to Social Movement

Agitation

115

discursively controlling its meaning" or "a contested space that political actors struggle to control
through discourse" (Wilson 133). Prudence does not have to be a static concept; rather,
communicators negotiate prudence through discourse. Ín Walker, Stewart's majority and Brennan's
dissent both attempt to negotiate this prudence through their different perspectives on the case. In this
matter, although the protesters ultimately do not prevail legally, largely because five privileged rhetors
reinforce a conservative, or status quo-oriented, position (\ililson 145), the protesters eventually have
their hearing before the Supreme Court. This prudence is the middle-ground between capitulation and
violent repression, or, more specifically, between giving the protesters everything they requested and
using force on the streel, that the establishment works out to resolve the dispute at hand.
A slight tension exists between the entertaining of change by the establishment and the
conservative forum of law. lVhile traditionally the law has reified the status quo, particularly with
regard to race (Bell 1), this forum still can address some of the problems of U.S. society. Although the
majority takes a very conservative and authoritarian position, Brennan's dissent, offering a rhetorical
disruption on behalf of "marginal voices" (Wilson 145), takes a much more progressive position.
Despite being a member of the establishment, Brennan remains open to alternatives to the status quo
and uses the authority of the establishment, including legal precedents such as the Near v. Minnesota
and Keyishian v. Board of Regents precedents, noted above, to make a vigorous case for change
(Walker 344). Accordingly, progressive thinking on social problems can occur even in a traditionally
conservative forum like law, although that thinking may not always prevail in the particular case.
Implications of This Study
The foregoing analysis suggests several implications for social movement theory and the practice
social movements. For instance, the classical social movement theory
perspective of an essentially homogeneous establishment that responds to outsider agitation, outlined
in the works of scholars such as Stewart, Smith, and Denton, as well as Bowers, Ochs, and Jensen,
calls for some reconsideration. ln the Walker opinions, the establishment majority, led by Stewart,
chooses to control the civil rights protesters. However, the establishment dissent, led by Brennan,
would allow the protesters to violate what the dissent describes as an unconstitutional injunction and
law. Clearly, the establishment, made up of the members of the U.S. Supreme Court, is divided in its
response to agitation. Such a rhetorical dynamic does not sit easily within the classical understanding
of the establishment. Instead, this dynamic suggests an establishment sharply fractured and in conflict
with itself. rJ/hile the establishment does not "routinely resort to rent strikes, vigils, hartals,
renouncing honors, sit-ins, or other such nonviolent direct action techniques" (Simons, "On Terms"
313), sometimes a portion of the establishment, often the dissenting portion, may endorse such
techniques. Indeed, a slightly more refined perspective of how the establishment can respond to
agitation should lead to a deeper understanding of rhetoric within a social movement framework.
A closely-related insight is that, in the context of social movements, engagement is not just
between the agitators and the establishment. Rather, engagement can occur between different factions
of the establishment. As discussed in this essay, the Stewart majority and the Brennan dissent clash
with different factual narratives and legal arguments that come to antithetical conclusions. In a way,
this format for engagement leaves the agitators as an impetus for the ensuing discussion. When
resolution comes to the case that began with the marches, the main players are the establishment and
the establishment. In short, after the initial agitation, the focus of the conflict is within different facets
of the establishment itself.
Given such an engagement, the law can be another forum for negotiation of prudence in a social
.V/hile
controversy at hand.
some previous research has addressed the negotiation of prudence in the
(Wilson
legislature
131-49), the above consideration of Walker suppofs the idea that negotiation of
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prudence can take place in other government forums such as the court system. One example of this
negotiation has been over the social role of blacks in U.S. society, which has taken place in legislatures
(Wilson l3l-49), and, via cases such as Walker or Brown u Board of Education (483-96), has taken
place in the courts as well.
A ûnal insight is that the court system, although traditionally symbolic of the establishment and thus
potentially resistant to change, has the potential to function as a door through which advocates ofchange
can enter. This point addresses concems about outsider access to the establishment (Deluca 1-22),
especially since not all individuals and parties have equal åccess to the means of public communication
(Dee 94). Although in Walkcr the civil rights protesters lost their case, they came within one vote of
winning. This insight is in line with judicial history from the mid-twentieth century. For instance, during
the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. Supreme Court was especially open to change. V/ith the 1954 Brown v.
Boørd ofEducation decision that called for an end to racially segregated public schooling (483-96), the
1964 New York Times v. Sullivan decision that provided heightened protection for criticism of public
officials (254-92), the 1966 Miranda v. Arizona decision that strengthened criminal defendants'rights

against self-incrimination (436-99), and other cases, the Court proved remarkably open to change.
However, later versions of the U.S. Supreme Court, especially the Court under Chief Justice William
Rehnquist (Chemerinsþ 660-61), have proved to be more conservative in nature. Thus, under some, but
certainly not all, circumstances, the Court is open to advocacy for change, and those who advocate for
such change can make their arguments for change through this point of rhetorical access.
Advocates of change need to be aware of this doorway into the establishment. They should be able
to make their cases to empathetic members of the establishment such as the Justice Brennans of the
world and take advantage of the idea that empathetic insiders will pass on or develop such arguments
for change. In a way, observers might think of this dynamic as one in which outsiders are able to set
themselves up for vicarious negotiation of change with the establishment. If advocates of change
effectively study empathetic power figures within the establishment, this approach, over time, can be
a powerful tool for promoting social progress.
Since Walker, the federal courts have grappled with application of the collateral bar rule, including
in the news media context. For example, in the case of U.S. v. Dickinson, a federal district court had
issued contempt citations against two reporters who, against a court order, published testimony
obtained in open court. Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the reporters that the
injunction was unconstitutional (Dickinson 513-14), the appellate court eventually upheld the contempt
citations (Dickinson 374). Also, in the case of In the Matter of Providence Journal Comparry, a district
court had forbidden the publication of information the FBI had gained through electronic surveillance
of an organized crime figure, even though the newspaper had obtained the information legally from the
FBI. The First Circuit Court of Appeals found that, as a prior restraint on press communication, the
court order was transparently invalid; thus, the order could not justi$ a citation for contempt (In the
Matter of Providence Journal 1353). When the Supreme Court heard the case, the Court could have
clarified the collateral bar rule in the press context but concluded that the Court did not have jurisdiction
(U.5. v. Providence Journal 698-708). Since the special prosecutor in the case had not obtained
authority to represent the United States before the Court, the Court dismissed the writ of ceniorari (U.S.
v. Providence Joumal698-708). Consequently, application of the collateral bar rule in the news media
context has lacked the clarity that the press would have desired.
With regard to future study of the judiciary's responses to social movements, communication
scholars may want to examine other civil rights cases from the 1950s and 1960s. Furthernore,
scholars may want to consider more recent judicial responses, favorable or otherwise, to the rhetoric
of advocates who have spoken out for change. Studies of more recent cases may help in the
consideration of a broader array ofjudicial responses over time to calls for social progress. Ideally,
such scholarship will lead to a deeper understanding notjust of social movements, free speech, and
the judiciary, but also of their nexus and, more importantly, the impact of such a nexus on society.
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For helpful coÍiments on previous versions of this paper, the author thanks Marouf Hasian, Geoffrey Klinger, Tarla Rai
Peterson, Helga Shugart, David Vergobbi, and two anonymous reviewers. The author presented an eælier version of this paper
as part of a Freedom of Expression panel at the 95ô annual meeting of the National Communication Association in Chicago,
Illinois, in November 2009.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. The consequence of such application is that individuats' First Amendment rights have protection against the actions of stâte and
local govemments, notjust against the actions ofthe federal govemment (Nowak & Rotunda 496 &.1252).
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